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In 2000, a BMJ-edition book (1) straightforwardly pointed-
out the importance of providing effect measures with con-
fidence intervals (CI) when reporting the results of clinical/
epidemiological research, and not only the results of statis-
tical tests. However, medical doctors commonly seem to 
be more aware of formal statistical testing and more fas-
cinated with statistical significance than they are aware of 
the practical meaning of the location and size (and other 
properties) of the effect measure. The caveats of scientif-
ic reasoning based solely on the results of statistical tests 
and “the concept of ‘statistical significance’, typically assessed 
with an index called the P value” (2) have been thorough-
ly addressed. Here, we would only emphasize: the effect 
estimate (together with its CI) provides information that 
is not conveyed by the simple fact of it being “statistical-
ly significant” (P < 0.05) or not (P > 0.05) (whatever this, in 
its essence, would mean) (1) – imagine the effects of two 
preventive interventions, both associated with “P<0.05” 
(“statistically significant”), but one estimated at 5% relative 
risk reduction (95% CI 1.0 to 9.0) and the other estimated 
at 30% reduction (95% CI 26.0 to 34.0). This shifts the focus 
away from testing and onto the questions about practical 
relevance of the observed effects. This becomes a matter 
of methodological (how the effects were observed) and 
medical expertise, not just statistical. However, the process 
requires that some concepts, including CIs, are adequate-
ly perceived, since they could be quite confusing for non-
statisticians like medical doctors.
Research tends to identify generally applicable (generaliz-
able) principles about relationships between factors that 
affect occurrence, natural history/diseases outcomes, or 
may help distinguish between health and disease, that 
would support claims like “this lifestyle intervention reduc-
es the risk of type 2 diabetes by 30%”or “if this test is posi-
tive, it is 99% probable that the patient is indeed sick.” Such 
claims pertain to all potentially or actually diseased people 
at any time (population-wise claims). The inherent obstacle 
in this process is the fact that one cannot explore these re-
lationships by encompassing the entire population since 
population is not a fixed “body of people” – every day some 
members of the population of, eg, patients with chronic 
heart failure (CHF) die, while some are newly diagnosed. 
Therefore, one explores relationships between factors 
within samples from the population (even studies desig-
nated as population-based or nationwide are performed in 
samples) and then projects back to the population, ie, one 
estimates the population.
In 1937, Polish mathematician and statistician Jerzy Ney-
man introduced the concept of CIs (3) and defined the 
problem of estimation in the introductory sentences 
(quote):
(ia) The statistician is concerned with a population, 
π, which for some reason or other cannot be stud-
ied exhaustively. It is only possible to draw a sample 
from this population which may be studied in detail 
and used to form an opinion as to the values of cer-
tain constants describing the population π….
… the problem … is the problem of estimation. This 
problem consists in determining what arithmetical 
operations should be performed on the observation-
al data in order to obtain a result, to be called an es-
timate, which presumably does not differ very much 
form the true value of the numerical character…
(ii) The theoretical aspect of the problem of statisti-
cal estimation consists primarily in putting in a pre-
cise form certain vague notions mentioned in (i)… 
connected with the sentence describing the mean-
ing of the word estimate. What exactly is meant 
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by the statement that the value of the estimate “pre-
sumably” should not differ very much from the es-
timated number? The only established branch of 
mathematics dealing with conceptions bearing on 
the word “presumably” is the calculus of probability.”
Deriving from the calculus of probability, he demonstrated 
that it was impossible to assume that the estimate (as a 
single value) would be “exactly equal to” (quote) the pop-
ulation parameter (object of estimation), but rather, that 
the process needed to result in the estimation of limits “be-
tween which the true value [of the population parameter] 
presumably falls” (quote) (3). He named the interval defined 
by these limits – CI (3).
There are two conceptual (or philosophical) views on es-
timation and probability, Bayesian and frequentist (the 
former being older and named after the 18th century 
mathematician Thomas Bayes), with some specifics regard-
ing their respective computational methods. Both have 
wide applications in different scientific disciplines, each 
with its proponents who could commonly be defined also 
as opponents of the other (although the two philosophies 
are far from opposing). The concept of CIs and the close-
ly related concept of statistical hypothesis testing [also 
greatly contributed to by Neyman (4)] together with all the 
subsequent developments in the field are core frequentist 
concepts (the term frequentist comes from the view that 
probabilities of events or numerical values are defined by 
their relative frequency of occurrence in an infinite number 
of observations, ie, their occurrence in a long-run). Before 
we try to outline the main points about the two estimation 
philosophies, we point-out: (i) parameter is a population 
value that we want to estimate (“the true effect” or “the true 
value”); (ii) effect or statistic refers to any quantity that we 
determine in a sample in an attempt to estimate the popu-
lation value: ie, mean or median of some continuous vari-
able (eg, blood pressure), proportion of people with some 
characteristic (eg, cured), correlation or a regression coef-
ficient indicating an association between variables (eg, be-
tween blood glucose and cholesterol levels), difference in 
means or medians between groups of subjects, difference 
in proportions or ratio measures (eg, relative risk, odds ra-
tio, hazard ratio, incidence rate ratio) etc; (iii) population is 
defined by sets of characteristics, with no time constraints. 
For example, population of people with CHF refers to both 
present and future, and we know that there are at least 
two (sub)populations of CHF patients (5) – those with re-
duced left ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF) and those 
with preserved LVEF. Based on their characteristics, 
one of which is the fact that some interventions convey a 
considerable survival benefit in the former, but not in the 
latter, these are two different populations (5).
The main points of the Bayesian approach (6) are (i) param-
eter is a random variable, hence it needs to be estimated in 
a form of a probability distribution. This probability, large-
ly but not solely [see (ii)] defined by data observed in the 
sample, is called posterior probability or posterior proba-
bility distribution. The calculation of the posterior distribu-
tion is the final result of the Bayesian estimation process. 
One can define a certain appropriate point of this distribu-
tion that is located at the highest density of the probability 
of the “true effect”, eg, mean or median, ie, the point-esti-
mate, and an interval that contains the “true value” with a 
certain level of probability. This interval is called the cred-
ible interval (CrI), eg, 95% CrI tells us that the true popula-
tion value is contained between its lower and upper limits 
with 95% probability. Different types of CrIs (95%) could 
be constructed, eg, “equal-tail” intervals, where 2.5% prob-
ability of the location of the true effect is below the low-
er interval limit and 2.5% is above the upper limit; or the 
highest posterior density interval (HPD) – it may not have 
equal tails, but it is the shortest interval encompassing 
95% of the probability and any point contained within the 
interval “bears” a higher probability of the location of the 
true effect than any point outside the interval; (ii) poste-
rior probability is determined (calculated) based on three 
key elements. The first one is the prior probability or prior 
probability distribution or simply – the prior. It reflects our 
previous knowledge, or a belief or a hypothesis (H) about 
the true effect – what we think that the “true value is” be-
fore we have seen the data (ie, before we have done the 
sample-based observation). The second one is the infor-
mation collected by observing the sample (the data, D). 
The third element is the likelihood. Probability and likeli-
hood are commonly used synonymously. Here, likelihood 
means probability (P) of observing exactly what we have 
observed in the sample, if our prior (our “pre-data” hypoth-
esis, H) were true [likelihood = P(D|H)]. The computational 
part uses these three key elements to derive the posterior 
distribution – which, in a way, illustrates how our initial hy-
pothesis was modified by the data and is influenced both 
by the prior and the observation in the sample. Calculation 
of the positive and negative predictive values (PPV, NPV, re-
spectively) of a diagnostic test is a clear application of the 
Bayesian method: both PPV and NPV are posterior prob-
abilities, that is, post-test probabilities of a disease if a test is 
positive (PPV) or of no disease if the test is negative (NPV) – 
for any combination of sensitivity and specificity (observed 
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in the sample), they vary depending on the prevalence of a 
disease in the population (ie, the pre-test or prior probabil-
ity of the disease/no disease). This is the essence. A simple 
(hypothetical) example: a randomized controlled trial aims 
to assess whether a treatment T conveys a survival ben-
efit defined as a difference in 1-year mortality vs placebo 
(control, C) in patients with advanced stages of CHF with 
reduced LVEF who are already on their standard therapy. 
Considering the clinical setting and a potential meaning-
ful effect, it is estimated that 2000 patients need to be in-
cluded and randomized to T and to C in a 1:1 ratio, with 
randomization stratified by age and clinical severity stage 
(since both affect life expectancy). At the end, 1-year crude 
cumulative mortality is 20% with C and 16% with T. The 
T-C difference needs to be estimated with adjustment for 
age and baseline disease severity, ie, in a generalized lin-
ear model that models ln(risk) of death with T and with C 
to determine the difference [ln(riskT)-ln(riskC)] (exponen-
tiation of the difference yields relative risk, RR). Bayesian 
analysis: a) two options may be considered, (i) one with no 
relevant pre-study input that would result in a meaning-
ful (the so-called informed) prior, hence a so-called non-
informative prior is used, and (ii) another one using an in-
formed prior based on a pilot study indicating around 25% 
relative risk reduction and suggesting 95% probability of 
the effect being within the range between a 62.5% lower 
and a 50% higher relative risk; b) based on our input (prior 
and the data, ie, treatment, outcome, age, and disease se-
verity), the computational algorithm uses complex simula-
tion processes to generate and to randomly sample from 
a large number of simulated distributions to estimate the 
posterior distribution of ln(riskT)-ln(riskC): exponentiation 
of particular points of the distribution retrieves RR (me-
dian), equal-tail CrI (2.5 and 97.5 percentile), or HPD CrI. 
Based on the results (Table 1), we conclude that the risk of 
1-year mortality with T is relatively 20% lower than with C 
and that it is 95% probable that the effect is in the range 
between 34.4% lower and 4.8% lower. This is our claim 
about T. Note: SAS 9.4 for Windows (SAS Inc., Cary, NC) proc 
genmod (log link, binomial distribution) was used with (i) 
the built-in option for Bayesian analysis with Jeffreys prior; 
or (ii) a normal prior with mean -0.288 and variance 0.125 
for treatment (0, 1e6 for other effects). Visual inspection of 
the trace plots indicated good Markov chain convergence. 
The use of informative or non-informative priors in data 
analysis is a question of debate. In general, for data like the 
present hypothetical trial, non-informative priors are pre-
ferred. Similarly, the preference is toward HPD vs equal-tail 
CrIs (https://www.berryconsultants.com/use-bayesian-tri-
al/, accessed June 15, 2019).
The frequentist approach. The originating work (3) intend-
ed to define an estimation theory that would be independ-
ent from the Bayesian solution (ie, use of priors), which was 
dominant at the time (4). Main points (1,3,7,8) are (i) the pa-
rameter is a fixed but unknown value. In the CHF example 
– there is one constant “true population value” of the RR for 
T/C regarding 1-year mortality (true RR). No prior probabil-
ity is assigned to it and it is not estimated in a form of a 
probability distribution. It does not mean that we do not 
have “a clue” about what its value could be –this is just how 
the concept works. If we could encompass the entire pop-
ulation, then RR in the trial would equal the true RR; (ii) but 
we cannot, and we base the estimation on a sample. The 
sample is a random sample from the population; (iii) hence 
the estimate (the statistic, RR) determined in the sample is 
a random variable (unlike the parameter). If we were to 
draw a large number of independent random samples of 
the same size from the same population (studies; where 
not a single subject is included in more than one of the 
samples), and repeat the estimation process in exactly the 
same way, the estimates obtained in each of them would 
somewhat differ, simply by chance. Hence, the estimate 
(the statistic) is a random variable and has a certain prob-
ability distribution; (iv) probability distribution of the statis-
tic is called sampling distribution, and the by-chance vari-
ation of the estimates that constitute the sampling 
distribution is called sampling variation. Several points 
might be confusing. For example, if the population is not a 
“fixed body of people,” how can the sample be random 
when we cannot sample from the future? Even if one was 
to limit the population to the specific moment in time – 
what would random mean? In epidemiology, particularly, 
there is a whole branch dealing with the (random) sam-
pling procedures. For example, if one is interested in the 
nationwide status of some disease or an opinion on 
some political issue in 2019, there are methods that en-
able generation of the sample of the population 
Table 1. Results of the bayesian analysis of the hypothetical 
randomized trial comparing treatment (T) to control (C) re-
garding 1-y mortality in patients with advanced chronic heart 
failure. Results are relative risks (RR) with highest posterior 
density (HPD) or equal-tail (2.5 to 97.5 percentile) 95% credible 
intervals (CrI) for two scenarios: one using a non-informative 
prior (Jeffreys) and another one using a normal (mean -0.288, 
variance 0.125) prior probability distribution for treatment
 
RR
95% CrI 
(HPD)
95% CrI 
(2.5-97.5)
Non-informative prior 0.800 0.656-0.952 0.664-0.964
Informative prior 0.829 0.682-0.981 0.692-0.993
STATISTICALLY SPEAKING 378 Croat Med J. 2019;60:375-82
www.cmj.hr
2019 that is random and, hence, representative of thus de-
fined population. In clinical studies, however, we never 
have a random sample of patients (not even of those “po-
tentially available at the time”). But, we behave as if we did 
and there are things that can and need to be done to as-
certain that the sample (of subjects) included in a study 
fairly well represents the population. Next, in reality, for 
some “true values” we only have one estimate: eg, one 
large clinical trial for a new treatment in CHF patients with 
a statistic determined only once (5). How can one numeri-
cal value be “distributed”? Sampling distribution is an ab-
stract construct and could be determined for any statistic 
by mathematical procedures. It just happens so that sam-
pling distribution of practically any statistic is a normal or 
near-normal distribution: if the population distribution is 
normal – sampling distribution is normal regardless of the 
number of observations; if the population distribution is 
not normal, sampling distribution becomes near-normal 
already with ∼ 20 observations (says the Central Limit Theo-
rem). We use a simple example that illustrates the general 
principle. Let us define our population of interest as a finite 
one, say “10-year old boys in the country in 2019,” and let us 
say that the characteristic of interest is their height. Each 
member of the population has its own value, ie, height (in 
cm). Distribution of their individual values is the popula-
tion distribution. It is a normal distribution and one of the 
parameters that define it is its “center” or the mean – popu-
lation mean or mean of the population distribution (m). 
This is the fixed value (“true value”) that we want to esti-
mate. To do so, we take a random sample from the popula-
tion and determine the sample mean (the statistic). How-
ever, the “link” between the sample and the population is 
not a direct one – sampling distribution of the sample sta-
tistic is an “in-between” step that connects them: the sam-
ple mean ( ) is a realization of the random variable height 
(conceived as a range of calculated in a large number of 
independent random samples of the same size taken from 
the same population), ie, of the mean of the sampling dis-
tribution of . The mean of the sampling distribution ( ) 
is, hence, a statistic of a statistic (mean of the distribution of 
means from many samples). The “link” between the sample 
statistic  and the population parameter m is in the fact 
that  (statistic of the sample statistic) = m. So, using a 
sample, we calculate   which is the point-estimate of 
 = m. It might not be clear why would one need this “in-
between” step. Note: even if finite, the entire population is 
never encompassed; population probability distribution is 
a hypothetical one; its mean, our “target” is fixed, but we 
try to estimate it using random samples, hence esti-
mates (sample-based statistic) vary (sampling varia-
tion); while point-estimation is rather straightforward, the 
fact that estimates are random variables (hence have a 
probability distribution) is the key point – one needs a 
framework for mathematical operations that enable one to 
account for this fact in defining the interval estimate of the 
“true value”; (v) another term that is a part of this theoreti-
cal concept that needs to be mentioned is sampling error 
(9). Assuming that we indeed took an “ideally” random 
sample (hence, representative for the population, ie, “pop-
ulation in a nutshell”), the sample-based statistic would de-
flect from the “true value” purely by chance, ie, due to the 
sampling variation. Namely, the fact that statistics from dif-
ferent samples differ (by chance) from each other means 
also that each of them inherently differs from the “true val-
ue.” Sampling error refers to the distance of the sample sta-
tistic from the “true value.” It is only natural that one would 
like to know how much the observed sample value de-
flects from the “true value,” ie, what its (sampling) error is. 
This question reflects the uncertainty about the relation-
ship between the point-estimate and the “true value.” Sam-
pling error is a theoretical construct since we would need 
to know the “true value” in order to be able to directly de-
termine how much the estimate differs from it. Yet, we can 
assign a quantity to the sampling error by using the sam-
ple and the concept of sampling distribution. But, note – 
this entire concept is based on assumptions of an “ideally” 
random sample and a deflection that has no other sources 
but pure chance, and on a theoretical distribution of an “in-
finite number of such samples.” To continue with the sim-
ple example of the sample mean ( ), Figure 1 depicts the 
relationship between a hypothetical population distribu-
tion and the sampling distribution: a) population mean, m, 
is the “true value”; b) another parameter that defines nor-
mal distribution is a measure of dispersion of probability 
“around” the mean of the distribution – population stand-
ard deviation (σ); c) mean of the sampling distribution ( ) 
is an estimate of m (assumes  = m); d) standard deviation 
of the sampling distribution – a measure of dispersion in 
the sampling distribution that is an estimate of σ is called 
– standard error (SE). Standard error can be quantified us-
ing data in the sample, ie, it is another sample-based statis-
tic and its numerical value illustrates the sampling error. We 
already established that  → . Regarding SE, there are 
different methods for calculation for different statistic/ef-
fect measures (1), but the generally followed logic is as fol-
lows: use the measure of spread in the sample → estimate 
the measure of spread of the sampling distribution. The ex-
ample of the SE of a sample mean ( ) [SE = SD , where 
SD is sample standard deviation, ie, measure of spread in 
the sample, and n is the number of subjects in the sample] 
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illustrates two general principles: (a) for any given number 
of subjects in the sample, larger the variability of the values 
in the sample – larger the SE; (b) for any given variability 
observed in the sample, larger the sample – lower the nu-
merical value of SE (1). In other words, (b) tells that the con-
cept implies that with a larger sample the error, ie, “deflec-
tion of the point-estimate from the true value” would be 
smaller. This sounds intuitive since, as we said, if the sample 
could encompass the entire population, then the estimate 
would be = true value, ie, there would be no error; (vi) sam-
ple point-estimate and its SE are used to construct the CIs 
around it. Different methods are used for calculation of the 
CIs around different statistic/effect measures (1). The ex-
ample of the sample mean and CIs around it outlines the 
general principle that the distances of the lower and the 
upper limits from the point-estimate are in this or that way 
defined as multiples of the standard error. From Figure 1, it 
is quite obvious that in the case of the sample mean, the 
95% CIs are . It is also obvious that for 90% CIs 
or for 99%CIs, different multiples of SE would be used, and 
for the given SE the intervals would be narrower (90% CI) 
or wider (99% CI) than the 95% CI. Two further points (can-
not be perceived from Figure 1): a) in cases in which the 
assumption of a near-normal sampling distribution (eg, 
Student’s t-distribution) is more appropriate than the as-
sumption of a normal distribution, similar but different 
multiples of SE would be used to construct CIs, and these 
would depend also on the number of subjects in the sam-
ple (study) (1); b) for some statistics, CIs around the point-
estimate are symmetrical, for some they are not (1); (vi) to 
get back to the T vs C trial in CHF patients: a) there are no 
priors, ie, estimation of the population value is based solely 
on what is observed in the sample; b) we implement ap-
propriate calculation method, ie, “frequentist” analysis of a 
generalized linear model to obtain the measure of the ef-
fect of T (adjusted for age and disease severity). Again, “eve-
rything is done” with ln(riskT) and ln(riskC) and their differ-
ence: results are summarized in Table 2. Based on the 
results, we conclude that the risk of 1-year mortality with T 
is relatively 20% lower, with 95% CI from 33.7% lower to 
FIguRe 1. graphical representation of normal distribution, ie, “the bell-shaped curve” (probability density function). The curve on 
the left is designated as “population distribution,” a hypothetical one – since no research ever encompasses the entire population. 
Two parameters that define it are its center, ie, population mean (m; to be distinguished from a mean value of some continuous 
variable determined in a sample from the population –  ) and a measure of dispersion of probability around the mean, ie, popula-
tion standard deviation (σ; to be distinguished from a standard deviation of some continuous variable determined in a sample from 
the population – SD). The table below indicates the percentage of probability contained in intervals defined as deflections from the 
mean expressed as multiples of σ added to or subtracted from the mean. The curve on the right is exactly the same, but is desig-
nated as a theoretical one (may be derived by mathematical simulations based on the sample data) and is named sampling distribu-
tion as it represents the distribution of statistics (estimates of m) observed in an infinite number of independent random samples 
from the population. The difference vs population distribution is pointed-out by the used symbols:  for the mean and Se (standard 
error) for the standard deviation. The two parameters of the sampling distribution are estimates of the respective parameters of the 
population distribution and it is assumed (since referring to the distribution of estimates from an infinite number of independent 
random samples from the population) that  = m and Se = σ. See text for further explanations.
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3.4% lower. The estimate is closely similar to the Bayesian 
point-estimate and CrI. In this and many cases, frequentist 
CIs and Bayesian CrIs could be identical or closely similar, 
but in many – they would not (particularly when the so-
called informative priors are used) (6,8). Note: SAS for Win-
dows 9.4 (SAS Inc., Cary, NC), proc genmod with log link 
and Possion distribution, with a robust (“sandwich”) vari-
ance estimator.
With both the Bayesian and the frequentist approach we 
obtained a point-estimate – and this is our best estimate 
(given the data) of the “true value.” There is, however, one 
obvious difference: for CrI we stated it was 95% probable 
that it contained the “true value” (based on the whole proc-
ess we undertook), while here, we make NO probabilistic 
statement related to the calculated 95% CI. We are tempt-
ed to do so, just as for the Bayesian CrI: such a statement 
would be a “natural answer” to a “natural question” (6) – we 
wanted an answer to the question “does T convey any sur-
vival benefit?”; for this purpose, we did the trial; when the 
trial is done and the estimate generated, the natural ques-
tion is – does the interval contain the true value, or – how 
probable it is that it does? Next, our (medical) practice is 
in its essence largely Bayesian (10). For example, by taking 
medical history and by examining a patient, we gradually 
form an opinion about the probability of a certain diagno-
sis (vs other possibilities) that drives our decisions about 
subsequent diagnostic tests (in essence – this is the Baye-
sian prior probability) and affects our opinion about the 
probability of the respective diagnosis after seeing the test 
results (the posterior probability): eg, a slightly elevated 
value of some laboratory parameter might diminish the 
probability of a diagnosis when the preceding knowl-
edge (medical history, physical examination) indicated a 
low probability of a diagnosis (low prior probability) or be 
considered as confirmatory for the diagnosis when previ-
ous knowledge strongly suggested the diagnosis (high 
prior probability). So, we are continuously dealing 
with probabilities, and thus are, likely, inherently prone to 
perceive the CI around the point-estimate as a probability 
statement. There has been a lot of discussion about what 
the frequentist CIs are and what they are not (6,8,11,12), 
commonly involving the debate about CrIs vs CIs, ie, Baye-
sian vs frequentist views (and which is better for science). 
But, even if one is to stay within the frequentist framework 
– many different misinterpretations of CIs have been gen-
erated (12). One of the most common ones is exactly the 
one of assigning a probabilistic statement to CIs in the 
way it is done with Bayesian CrIs (12) – and appears to be 
equally common among statisticians and non-statistician 
scientists and students (11,13). However, it is not correct 
and was not originally claimed (3,14,15). We need to go 
back to the essence of the concepts: (i) with Bayesian ap-
proach, the parameter is a random variable, hence needs 
to be estimated by a probability distribution. The point-
estimate and the limits of CrI are fixed – they are points 
of a generated posterior distribution – hence, “CrIs make 
a direct probability statement about themselves”, ie, that 
it is 95% probable (for 95% CrIs) that they, based on the 
entire completed process, contain the true value; (ii) with 
frequentist approach, parameter is a fixed point, it does 
not have a probability distribution. However, the point-es-
timate and CIs around it are random variables – they have 
a theoretical probability distribution (sampling distribu-
tion) based on which, for the given study, they are gener-
ated. Once calculated, CIs either cover or do not cover the 
true value – we cannot make any probability statements 
about it based on the sole fact that we calculated them. 
Since the sampling distribution based on which they are 
derived is composed of “many samples, with many respec-
tive estimates and CIs” that differ one from the other, one 
also cannot say that 95% of the point-estimates (from the 
very same sampling distribution) would fall within the one 
particular 95% CI that we have determined (12). What we 
can say and what is in line with the frequentist philosophy 
that defines probability as relative occurrence of events/
values over a large number of repeated observations is – 
if the underlying model is correct and the only source of 
variability is chance (sampling variation) alone (ie, there 
is no systematic error in the process), then if one is to re-
peat the entire (valid) process in an unlimited number of 
independent random samples of the same size and from 
the same population – at least 95% of thus generated CIs 
would cover the true value (or 90% or 99% – if these are the 
CIs that are of interest) (8,12). So, a specific CI also “conveys” 
a “probability message,” but not about its own probabili-
ty of containing the true value, but about coverage prob-
ability – ie, probability that the unobserved (“unlimited” 
Table 2. Results of the frequentist analysis of a hypotheti-
cal randomized trial comparing treatment (T) to control 
(C) regarding 1-year mortality in patients with advanced 
chronic heart failure. Calculations are based on ln(risk): 
mean difference ln(riskT) – ln(riskC) = -0.2232; standard er-
ror = 0.0962; since the sampling distribution of the ln(relative 
risk) is normal, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the differ-
ence = -0.2232 ± 1.96 × 0.0962, ie, -0.4116 to -0.0347. Relative 
risk (RR) and its 95% CI are obtained by exponentiation of 
these values
RR 95% CI
T vs C 0.800 0.663-0.966
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members of the respective sampling distribution) intervals 
generated by the same valid procedure do cover the true 
value 95% percent of the time. In other words, the “95% 
probability” refers to the procedure, not to the one specific 
calculated CI. So, what does this mean for us at the very 
moment of looking at the obtained estimate? What are CIs 
to us? Why would we care about possible outcomes of un-
observed repetitions that anyhow are only hypothetical? 
How should we view CIs calculated in this particular study? 
In their “statistical essence,” CIs are indicators of uncertain-
ty about the point-estimate (remember SE as a “measure” 
of sampling error, ie, distance of the point-estimate from 
the true value), which is (uncertainty) due to chance alone, 
but may be problematic because they depend on the cor-
rectness of probability models and sampling properties 
(8). Some authors consider CIs to be useless, mainly due 
to their close relationship to hypothesis testing and “P val-
ues,” and suggest they should be abandoned in favor of 
Bayesian CrIs (11). Regarding the interpretation of (95%) 
CIs, the 2000 BMJ-edition book (1) states (p.17): “Put simply, 
this means that there is 95% chance that the indicated range 
includes the ‘population value’…, while another paper (12), 
co-authored by one of the co-authors of the cited quote, 
points-out such an interpretation as incorrect (quote: [mis-
interpretation No. 19] ”The specific 95% confidence interval 
presented by a study has a 95% chance of containing the true 
effect size. – No!”). The same author, in another source (16), 
along with a strictly correct definition of CIs states: “Little is 
lost by the common but less pure interpretation of the CI as a 
range of values within which we can be 95% sure the popula-
tion value lies.”
Hence, apart from the message that the frequentist CIs and 
Bayesian CrIs convey different information, and that the in-
formation conveyed by the former is not the one we com-
monly think it is – everything else is rather confusing. We 
may become even more confused when we consider the 
following two facts: a) Bayesian methods have had wide 
applications in biomedicine, particularly in the analysis of 
large complex data (eg, those produced by genomic and 
other omic analyses) (17), in pharmacokinetic-pharmaco-
dynamic modeling, meta-analysis, their use in clinical trials 
is growing, particularly in adaptive-design sequential trials, 
and similar is the situation in epidemiology (18); b) how-
ever, frequentist methods have predominated, in eg, clini-
cal and epidemiological research. We will skip the question 
whether this is “good or bad” [because (i) it is beyond our 
reach; (ii) the answer might be neither, or one or the other 
or even a combined approach might be better, depending 
on the problem addressed; (iii) because in some situations 
CIs and CrIs not only agree but could be interpreted in the 
same way (6,8,17,19,20)], and address another one – does 
it mean that we have been continuously wrong (since rely-
ing mainly on frequentist methods) about relationships of 
interest? Over the decades, a huge number of estimates 
of the “frequentist type” have been made resulting in de-
cisions (diagnostic, therapeutic, prophylactic) that have 
greatly improved medical practice. So, the concept seems 
to work. Whether and how statistical estimation could be 
improved is beyond our reach. However, in respect to spe-
cifically the concept of CIs it seems that, for all practical 
purposes, medical doctors who need to read and under-
stand published papers on a daily basis could well accept, 
without “major harm,” the view expressed (1,16), although 
also dismissed (12), about interpretation of CIs from a sin-
gle study (regardless of how conceptually and factually in-
correct it might be): “Little is lost by the common but less pure 
interpretation of the CI as a range of values within which we 
can be 95% sure the population value lies” (16). But it needs to 
be added: the view that it is plausible to be “95% sure” that 
one specific actually realized CI that belongs to a range of 
hypothetical CIs, 95% of which (presumably) do cover the 
true value, includes the “truth” would hold only if “the proc-
ess,” ie, the way in which data were collected and analyzed 
was a valid one. By saying this, we need to move away 
from the strictly statistical (conceptual and computation-
al) views about “estimation of reality,” regardless of how es-
sentially important they are, toward the equally important 
elements of the process that are inherently easier for us to 
understand. We will assume that in any individual study, 
statisticians have done their work correctly, that they have 
chosen the adequate approach and methodology for data 
processing, and that corresponding interval estimates (CrIs 
or CIs) are provided. The point is – while this part is clearly 
important, no statistical method can mend the flaws that 
occur in the process of data gathering (be it an experi-
mental or observational study) – if data are invalid, the es-
timates (whatever their theoretical basis) will be invalid. So, 
we need valid data in order to get estimates that are “on 
target.” An inherent consequence of the fact that no one 
actually knows what the true value is, is that there is no im-
mediate way to check this– eg, years could go by before 
we realize that an intervention is not as effective or that it is 
more harmful than initially estimated. Off-target estimates 
come as a consequence of systematic (bias) and random 
errors in the process of data gathering and estimation: this 
is the question of research methodology. Therefore, we 
need to be familiar with research methodology: types 
of studies appropriate for respective questions, their 
reaches and limitations, types of various biases to 
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which such studies are sensitive, and methods of “protec-
tion” against them. A point-estimate generated in a study 
that, by type and design, has a potential to be accurate and 
could be judged as “well protected from bias” – is highly 
likely to be close to the “true value,” although we might not 
necessarily be able to say “how close” and “how likely” (or 
express this as, eg, a percentage). The interval around it (be 
it Bayesian or frequentist, 90%, 95% or 99%, or any other) 
would then be highly likely to cover the “truth.” We would 
therefore state that CIs (around estimates) provide impor-
tant information that goes beyond the results of statistical 
tests and P values, regardless of their inherent close rela-
tionship to statistical testing (and P values) and their inher-
ent conceptual limitations/fallacies. They should always be 
viewed within the entire context – for a study (experimen-
tal, observational or meta-analysis), this refers to its gen-
eral appropriateness for the addressed question, design, 
and conduct characteristics and, of course, adequacy of 
the implemented statistical procedure. If these elements, 
ie, this “methodological package” could be considered val-
id – then we may consider the resulting CI around the es-
timate as a reliable indicator about the location and size 
of the true value, and thus, as a reliable basis to consider 
the practical relevance of this (true) value, regardless of the 
results of statistical tests. Although it may sound heretic, 
under such circumstances, for all practical purposes it be-
comes of less relevance to us whether the interval is a di-
rect probability/certainty/confidence statement or not. At 
the end, we build our final “certainty” or “confidence” about 
size of the true effects based on (i) independent replication 
of estimates arising from methodologically adequate pro-
cedures and (ii) concordant estimates from different types 
of studies.
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